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ABSTRACT
Defending the Internet against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
is a fundamental problem. Despite over a decade of research, little progress
has been made on the real-world deployment of proposed approaches due
to the prohibitive deployment hurdles. This thesis presents FlowPolice, a
new DDoS defense mechanism capable of thwarting millions of attack flows,
while requiring very lightweight deployment. Specifically, FlowPolice can
immediately benefit the first deployed autonomous system (AS) without fur-
ther deployment at other ASs, and a single deployed router can protect all
downstream links that implement a simple prioritization mechanism. The
design of FlowPolice suppresses attack traffic by forcing attackers to be ac-
countable for congestion via proper rate limiting. To learn users’ congestion
accountability, FlowPolice leverages a capability feedback mechanism so that
the deploying router can make rate limiting decisions based only on its self-
generated capability tags.
We use theoretical analysis, large scale simulation and Linux implemen-
tation to demonstrate the effectiveness of FlowPolice. Specifically, the the-
oretical analysis proves that FlowPolice ensures per-flow fair share at the
bottleneck link. Our implementation shows that FlowPolice can scale up to
handle very large scale DDoS attacks and introduces little packet process-
ing overhead. We also perform detailed packet-level simulation to show that
FlowPolice is effective to mitigate DDoS attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are a serious threat to the In-
ternet. In a flooding based DDoS attack, attackers paralyze Internet services
by sending excessive packets to exhaust the servers’ network bandwidth so
as to stop legitimate users from accessing services. Over the past decades,
the Internet has grown from a small research network to a piece of critical
infrastructure with significant social, economic and political influence. Be-
cause of the newfound importance of the Internet, DDoS attacks can cause
millions of dollars worth of financial losses. However, today’s Internet is still
fragile to DDoS attacks. According to reports from Arbor Networks [1] and
Prolexic [2], DDoS attacks have grown in both size and frequency in 2014.
The meteoric rise in the significance of the Internet has brought forth a
fundamental research challenge: How can we make the Internet more resilient
to large scale DDoS attacks? Over a decade of research, there have been
many proposals [3–19] to address this challenge. The previous approaches
can be categorized into two major groups: network filtering based approaches
(e.g., [6, 10]) and capability based approaches (e.g., [13, 14]). We discuss this
distinction further in Chapter 7. Although these proposals are designed to let
DDoS victims suppress attack traffic, unsatisfactory progress has been made
on the real-world deployment due to prohibitive deployment hurdles [20, 21].
A significant deployment problem is that a deploying autonomous sys-
tem (AS) yields no benefit until other AS also deploys the protocol. The
inter-dependency among ASs creates a chicken-and-egg deployment problem.
Specifically, most previous approaches require cooperation and coordination
among ASs along the path to defend against attack. However, such large-
scale cooperation is difficult to achieve in the Internet due to the large number
of administrative domains. For instance, the filtering based approaches (e.g.,
Pushback [6, 7], Passport [11]) rely on the ASs close to the attack source to
block the attack traffic. However, these ASs may be beyond the control of the
1
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Figure 1.1: Deployment hurdles for filter-based and capability-based
systems.
victim AS and may not even deploy the defense protocol (Figure 1.1(a)). Sim-
ilarly, capability based schemes (e.g., TVA [13], NetFence [14]) also require
capability operation at remote ASs and need a large fraction of deployment
to secure the entire AS (Figure 1.1(b)).
In this thesis, we propose a new DDoS defense mechanism, FlowPolice, to
address the chicken-and-egg deployment problem. In particular, FlowPolice
offers three desirable deployment features.
Local deployment: FlowPolice can immediately benefit the first deploying
AS without any additional deployment at other ASs. The local deployment
feature incentivizes deployment, even for the first AS.
Single deployment A FlowPolice deploying router can effectively suppress
attack traffic even if congestion happens on a downstream link where the
cryptographic protections of FlowPolice are not deployed. Therefore, if a
link has a single FlowPolice router along each uplink path, that link is com-
pletely protected. The single deployment feature further reduces deployment
requirements and maximizes deployment efficiency.
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Minimal trust: The FlowPolice router needs to trust only values created
by that router in making rate limiting decisions. Since FlowPolice places no
trust in other routers or other ASs, FlowPolice is more robust than previous
work with weaker trust models.
FlowPolice’s novel design provides these three desirable deployment fea-
tures while effectively defending DDoS attacks (Chapter 2). (i) In flooding
based DDoS attacks, attackers maliciously inject excessive packets into the
network to cause severe congestion. To suppress attack traffic, FlowPolice
forces attackers to take accountability for the congestion by rate limiting. (ii)
To learn users’ congestion accountability, FlowPolice relies on unforgeable
capability tags created by the deployed router itself. Therefore, FlowPolice
can effectively stop attack traffic and ensure bandwidth share for legitimate
users, while requiring no inter-router trust and deployment only at the victim
AS.
The major contributions of this thesis are the design, implementation and
evaluation of a new DDoS defense approach FlowPolice, which offers three
desirable deployment features. We implement FlowPolice on Linux to demon-
strate that FlowPolice’s scalability. For instance, a single deployment on a
commodity PC can effectively handle 100 million attack flows (Section 5.1).
Furthermore, FlowPolice’s packet processing overhead is small so that the
deploying router introduces negligible networking overhead, Finally, we de-
signed detailed packet-level simulation to demonstrate that FlowPolice can
effectively mitigate large scale DDoS attacks.
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CHAPTER 2
DESIGN RATIONALES
In this chapter, we describe the insights that lead to the design decisions of
FlowPolice. We start with the problem space and design goals of FlowPolice.
2.1 Problem Space
Network flooding based DDoS attacks: FlowPolice focuses on mitigat-
ing flooding based DDoS attacks where attackers maliciously send excessive
packets to exhaust the network bandwidth so as to stop legitimate users from
getting adequate bandwidth. Resource exhaustion at other layers, such as
the SYN flooding attack [22], are orthogonal to FlowPolice. Some applica-
tion layer defense protocol can be incorporated with FlowPolice to provide
even stronger defense (see more discussion in Chapter 6).
Adversary model: We consider strong adversaries that can compromise
both end hosts and routers and adaptively adjust their attack strategies. For
instance, they can launch on-off shrew attacks [23] to evade detection, collude
to grant each other traffic capabilities, spoof addresses and can recruit large
numbers of botnets to launch large scale DDoS attacks.
2.2 Design Goals
Deployable in the Internet architecture: The major design goal of
FlowPolice is to be a defense system that is deployable in the current Internet
architecture. To this end, we propose FlowPolice with three deployment
features (i.e., local deployment, single deployment and minimal trust) to
minimize deployment hurdles.
Guaranteed fair bandwidth share: FlowPolice provably guarantees that
legitimate users can get at least per-flow fair share for the bottleneck band-
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width no matter what strategies attackers use. The flow means all aggregate
traffic matching certain patterns. For instance, in the case where attackers
try overflow the network resource of a public server, the worst case band-
width share for legitimate users is determined by the ratio of the number of
compromised hosts to the number of legitimate senders; i.e., per-sender fair-
ness is achievable. When some attackers do not strictly comply with the rate
policing from FlowPolice, legitimate senders can get even more bandwidth
share (see discussion in Chapter 5). Note that to ensure fairness, FlowPo-
lice do not assume that IP address spoofing is eliminated. We will further
elaborate the reason in Section 3.5.
Scalable and lightweight: FlowPolice is proposed to handle large scale
DDoS attacks involving millions of attack flows, while using lightweight
packet processing at relatively few nodes, resulting in negligible network over-
head. When network operators are able to deploy FlowPolice at the upstream
of all potential bottleneck links within their ASes, a single deployment in the
AS is enough to secure the entire AS.
2.3 Enforce Congestion Accountability
Flooding based DDoS attacks represent an extreme form of network conges-
tion where adversaries maliciously inject excessive packets into the network.
A bottleneck router drops packets at random from all senders, regardless of
whose traffic contributes more to the congestion. In other words, congestion
accountability is not considered while dropping packets. Consequently, legit-
imate users are equally affected by congestion, even when such congestion
is disproportionately caused by attackers. FlowPolice addresses this dispro-
portionality by enforcing bandwidth limits on senders that consistently con-
tribute to the congestion in the face of severe packet losses; i.e., FlowPolice
enforces congestion accountability in case of DDoS attacks.
Next we consider how to determine each participating flow’s congestion
accountability. Even in normal scenarios, congestion can also happen in the
Internet. Legitimate senders (e.g., TCP senders) adjust their rates based
on the available bandwidth so that all participating flows are able to get
their share. However, in DDoS attacks, the congestion is deliberately caused
by attackers. They try to overflow the network and may not back off even
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when they are aware that they are experiencing severe congestion. Therefore,
one sender’s congestion accountability should be determined by whether it
adaptively changes its rate based on the current network condition and tries
to relieve congestion when it happens.
FlowPolice uses the packet loss rate over an extended period of time (much
larger than typical Internet RTTs) to quantify each sender’s congestion ac-
countability since senders that continue to transmit in spite of congestive
losses are more accountable for the congestion. Note that FlowPolice does
not police traffic based on a single or several packet losses to avoid false posi-
tives. FlowPolice enforces bandwidth limits on the senders whose packet loss
rate exceeds a threshold, punishing senders that continuously contribute to
congestion so as to throttle the unwanted traffic.
2.4 Fairness Guarantee
Another desirable feature for FlowPolice’s policing policy is to ensure per-
sender fair share at the bottleneck link. Specifically, FlowPolice keeps a
rate limiting window for each flow in case of DDoS attacks so that no
sender can send faster than its rate limiting window. Via an additive-
increase/multiplicative-decrease (AIMD) update for the rate limiting win-
dows, FlowPolice probably ensures that all senders’ bandwidth share con-
verges to fairness (see details in Section 3.6.4).
Next we discuss how FlowPolice learns each flow’s loss rate so as to deter-
mine its congestion accountability.
2.5 Why Capability Feedback?
Inferring packet losses is the core problem in FlowPolice’s design, since the
further steps rely on correct packet loss information. However, in the In-
ternet, it is challenging for an intermediate router to infer a flow’s packet
losses, since losses can happen downstream, and because return traffic will
likely take a different path. Furthermore, one flow may cross ASs controlled
by different network administrative units, limiting the usefulness of network
management tools in loss-rate inference.
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In FlowPolice, senders self-report their packet losses. As in re-feedback [24],
in which each packet carries a congestion metric, FlowPolice adopts capability
feedback to infer packet losses. Specifically, each FlowPolice router stamps
a unique unforgeable capability tag on each traversing packet (Section 3.4).
When the packet is received, the receiver returns the capability back to the
sender (as in [13, 14, 25, 26]). Then the sender includes the capability tag
in future packets to demonstrate to the FlowPolice router that the previous
packet has been received. Otherwise, if the capability tag is not sent back
to the FlowPolice router after a certain time interval (defined as detection
period in Section 3.6.3), the router will consider that packet to have been
lost. The router can use these reports to infer packet loss rates regardless of
the number of downstream links the packet traverses.
2.6 Why Local Information?
FlowPolice infers packet losses only based on local information (capabilities
created by the router that uses them). We believe that such a design removes
FlowPolice’s deployment hurdles while enhancing its robustness. Specifically,
as the FlowPolice router infers packet loss using only capabilities created by
that router, FlowPolice does not require coordination with other routers.
Therefore, the first deployed ASs can yield immediate benefits, resolving the
chicken-egg deployment problem. Furthermore, since FlowPolice can infer
remote packet losses, a single deployed router can protect all its downstream
links by suppressing attack traffic locally. Thus FlowPolice only requires a
small deployment to protect a large fraction of the network.
Moreover, trusting only self-created tags improves system robustness. Specif-
ically, FlowPolice capabilities are unforgeable since they are generated based
on FlowPolice router’s private key. Therefore, even though some routers or
even ASes on the path are compromised, they cannot maliciously create valid
capabilities to break the defense protocol.1
1The compromised routers may simply drop all packets. Such a security problem is
known as the Internet hijack [27] or path validation, which is not the focus of this thesis.
Several approaches have been proposed (such as [28–30]) to defend against such attacks.
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2.7 How to Suppress Attack Traffic?
Congestion may happen at multiple links. However, it is difficult to determine
these bottleneck links before attacks, and enforcing deployment at all these
bottleneck links can be expensive. Therefore, FlowPolice provides a single
deployment feature so that network operators do not have to know where
the congestion happens to perform deployment and bottleneck routers do
not even have to deploy FlowPolice.
To begin with, FlowPolice uses severe packet losses over an extended pe-
riod of time to infer that some (remote) links are under DDoS attacks. Thus
even though bottleneck links may be varying over time, as long as Flow-
Police is placed at the upstream of them, FlowPolice is able to learn that
these links are under attack. In case of DDoS attacks, FlowPolice polices the
traffic as privileged packets and best-effort packets. Via the robust AIMD
updating mechanism for each flow’s rate limiting window, FlowPolice ensures
that all flows can only send fair amounts of privileged packets so as not to
flood the bottleneck link. Thus the bottleneck router can easily suppress the
unwanted traffic by prioritizing privileged packets over best-effort packets.
Note that FlowPolice places almost all the heavy lifting (e.g., state mainte-
nance, cryptography processing) at the upstream deploying router whereas
the downstream bottleneck links only need to implement a simple prioriti-
zation mechanism, which can be relatively achieved, for instance, by QoS
functionality. Furthermore, FlowPolice only polices the traffic that is ac-
countable for the congestion so that the “unaccountable” traffic (e.g., traffic
not traversing the downstream bottleneck router or well behaved senders)
will be not affected.
2.8 FlowPolice’s Deployment
FlowPolice’s single deployment feature allows network operators to secure
their ASs with small amounts of deployment. One example of a small-scale
deployment that can benefit a large number of potential victims is to deploy
FlowPolice in a middle-service, which we call CloudPolice. A potential victim
can obtain an IP address from CloudPolice. Then the victim serves DNS
replies with the CloudPolice IP address so as to redirect all of the victim’s
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traffic to CloudPolice. CloudPolice itself would deploy within the Internet
core, which increases its possibility to be located before any bottleneck link
and reduce its probability of being overflowed.
When CloudPolice receives a FlowPolice packet, CloudPolice performs
the flow policing functions of the FlowPolice router, then IP-in-IP encapsu-
lates [31] the packet to the actual destination, and finally pulls the FlowPolice
header to the outer IP header. For best effort traffic, CloudPolice simply IP-
in-IP encapsulates the packets without further processing. As long as the
bottleneck link gives sufficient priority to FlowPolice traffic, for example by
allocating a percentage of the link to FlowPolice traffic, all traffic routed
through CloudPolice will receive the benefits of FlowPolice. Depending on
the victim’s service provider’s ingress filtering policies, the victim can either
directly reply using the FlowPolice IP address, or can route its reply back
through CloudPolice using IP-in-IP encapsulation.
2.9 Is FlowPolice Scalable?
When under DDoS attack, a FlowPolice router performs per-sender rate lim-
iting to suppress attack traffic. Attackers may game the defense by exhaust-
ing the router table. The design of FlowPolice enables FlowPolice to scale up
to deal with extremely large scale attacks. To begin with, attackers who re-
cruitNA compromised hosts can only consume up toNA states; i.e., attackers
are not able to spoof IP addresses to fake excessive states in the router table.
Furthermore, FlowPolice’s single deployment feature gives network operators
an opportunity to secure their ASs with a small number of deployed routers,
given that the network operators know the in-AS topology and can perform
in-network routing control via platforms such as RCP [32]. Ideally, a single
deployed router can protect all the links within one AS. Therefore, network
operators can scale up FlowPolice’s performance, with reasonable cost, by
either deploying FlowPolice on a high-end hardware router or implementing
FlowPolice in a software router with large memories and high-speed CPUs.
For instance, our implementation on a commodity PC (with 8GB memory
and 3.4GHz CPUs) can effectively handle 100 million states (Section 5.1). It
is clear that we can further increase FlowPolice’s scalability with more ad-
vanced software router. Therefore, FlowPolice can effectively handle DDoS
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attacks even involving millions of botnets.
Besides scalability, another good feature offered by the single deployment
is that the packet processing delay is low since FlowPolice’s cryptographic
operations only need to be processed once. For instance, in our implementa-
tion (Section 5.1), per-packet processing overhead is ∼0.08µs, which transfers
to around 150Gbps throughput for the 1500B packet size. Thus, deploying
FlowPolice introduces negligible networking overhead.
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
In this chapter, we describe the design of FlowPolice. We start with the
system overview to construct a clear picture of FlowPolice’s components.
Then we detail the design of each component.
3.1 System Overview
The FlowPolice architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Similar to the pre-
vious capability based approaches [13, 14], FlowPolice categorizes packets
into three types: request packets, regular packets and legacy packets. Each
sender needs to send a request packet to initiate a new flow. In this thesis,
we use the term “flow” to indicate all traffic matching specific pattern (see
details in Section 3.5). The regular packets carry the capabilities stamped
by the FlowPolice router. The legacy packets are sent without carrying the
FlowPolice packet header. Protecting legacy packets is an open problem as
the original design of the Internet places too little emphasis on security [33].
FlowPolice only provide best-effort delivery for legacy packets.
The underlying packet processing logic of FlowPolice is as follows: when a
new packet arrives, the FlowPolice router first determines its type. If it is a
legacy packet, FlowPolice appends it to the legacy channel, which can only
consume a small fraction of the link capacity (e.g., less than 10%). If the
packet is a request packet, FlowPolice add an initial capability in the packet
header and forward the packet to the next hop. If the packet is a regular
packet, the FlowPolice router checks the capability feedback carried by the
packet and polices it based on its rate limiting decisions according to the
rate limiting logic (Section 3.6). Meanwhile, the FlowPolice router updates
information for the corresponding entry in the flow table (Section 3.6.1).
If the link directly connected to the FlowPolice router is not a bottleneck
11
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Figure 3.1: The architecture of FlowPolice. The deployed router enforces
congestion accountability to suppress attack traffic. A single deployed
router can protect all its downstream (potential) bottleneck links that
implement a simple prioritization mechanism.
IP Header
FlowPolice 
Header
TCP/UDP Header
PROTO(8) Flags(6) Packet ID (16)
Flow ID (32)
Timestamp (32)
MAC (128)
Type(2)
Figure 3.2: FlowPolice packet header format.
link, whereas congestion happens at some remote downstream links (as illus-
trated in Figure 3.1), then the bottleneck router can suppress the unwanted
traffic by simply prioritizing the privileged packets (marked by the Flow-
Police router) over the best effort packets (legacy packets and best-effort
FlowPolice packets).
3.2 FlowPolice Packet Header
We place the FlowPolice header in the shim layer between the IP protocol and
the transport layer protocol so that the applications need not be modified.
The FlowPolice header is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
FlowPolice packets are assigned a specific IP protocol number. The Flow-
Police header has a “next header” field (PROTO field in Figure 3.2) which
is the real protocol number, as in IPv6 hop-by-hop and destination options
headers. The Flags field is reserved. The Type field is used to decide the
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packet type. 00 represents request packets (marked by the sender), 10 repre-
sents best-effort FlowPolice packets and 11 stands for privileged FlowPolice
packets. The total size of the regular packet header is 28 bytes and the
request packet needs to include a Portcullis [16] header (Section 3.3).
3.3 Secure the Request Channel
The request packets are vulnerable to DDoS attacks as well. Specifically,
attackers can flood the request channel to stop legitimate users from getting
valid capabilities. Such attack is known as the Denial of Capability (DoC)
attack [16]. Two types of approaches have been proposed to address such
an attack. One is implementing per-sender rate limiting [14] at the request
channel so that each sender, including legitimate users, can finally get its
share. The second approach is based on the proof-of-work schemas [16, 17].
For instance, the Portcullis [16] protocol requires each sender to solve a puzzle
to send valid request packets. As adversaries have bounded computational
power, they are not able to flood the request channel all the time.
FlowPolice adopts the Portcullis [16] protocol to secure the request channel
for the sake of easy deployment. The per-send rate limiting approach relies
on source spoof defense protocols such as Ingress Filter [34] and Passport [11].
However, the effectiveness of these protocols relies on universal deployment,
which has not been implemented yet. Therefore, without ubiquitous de-
ployment, Internet-wide source spoofing is still possible [20]. In contrast,
Portcullis [16] is more deployment friendly. For instance, the puzzle can be
obtained relatively easily via the exiting DNS services. Furthermore, the puz-
zle based solution can be integrated into the IPv6 deployment, as proposed
in Mirage [21], which produces further deployment incentive.
3.4 Unforgeable Capability
The design of capability needs to meet the following requirements. (i) The
capability cannot be forged by others. (ii) It can be easily generated so that
the routers are not blocked while processing packets. (iii) The capability can
be re-generated on the fly for the purpose of verification; thus, the router
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does not need to store previously issued capability. The FlowPolice router
issues its capability as follows:
C = Pid || f || ts || MAC(Pid || f || ts), (3.1)
where Pid is packet ID, f is flow ID and ts is the timestamp. The meaning
of Pid and ts will be described in the next section (Section 3.5). The Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC) is computed using the router’s private key.
Since the capability incorporates a keyed MAC, no one besides the FlowPo-
lice router can generate valid capabilities. Further, we use AES-128 based
CBC-MAC for generating MAC due to its fast speed and availability at mod-
ern CPUs [35, 36]. Finally, the verification of capability is simply re-hashing
the inputs carried in the packet header and checking whether the output is
the same as the carried MAC.
3.5 Flow Table
In this section, we detail the flow table maintained by the FlowPolice router.
3.5.1 Flow entry creation
When the initial capability tagged in the request packet is fed back to the
FlowPolice router, the router needs to determine whether to create a new
flow entry in the flow table. If FlowPolice uses the traditional 5-tuple in
the packet to identify a flow, the number of flow entries attackers can con-
sume is determined by their computational power since we incorporate the
Portcullis protocol [16] to secure the request channel. In other words, Flow-
Police achieves per-computation fair share for the flow table among attackers
and legitimate users.
In some cases, we can further reduce the number of states consumed by
attackers in the flow table to the number of botnets they recruit. For instance,
when a AS deploys FlowPolice to protect its public servers (e.g., web servers),
FlowPolice can keep per-sender state (i.e., aggregating all traffic with same
source IP address as one flow) for the traffic sending to its servers. This is
because when attackers fake a source IP address not owned by their botnets
14
f TA Pid RT TC ST PR WR WV LR
64 32 16 1 1 32 32 32 128 64
Figure 3.3: Fields in each flow entry and the corresponding size (bits) for
each field (total ∼50 bytes).
in a request packet, they can only receive the initial capability issued by the
router and send it back to the FlowPolice router if the packet’s destination is
also compromised. Otherwise a legitimate receiver will return the capability
to the spoofed IP address so that attackers cannot obtain the capability.
Therefore, when the destination is known not be compromised,1 the number
of router states consumed by attackers is bounded by the number of botnets
they have. Note that in the case where FlowPolice is deployed in middle-
services, the service provider needs to be aware of the server addresses that
they try to protect.
When source spoofing is eliminated (e.g., Ingress Filter [34] has universal
deployment), it is safe to keep-sender state for all traffic.
3.5.2 Flow entry
We define a flow as all the traffic matching certain patterns. (i) All packets
whose capabilities have secure destination addresses and have the same source
address are aggregated as one flow. (ii) All packets whose capabilities have
insecure destination addresses and have the same destination address are
aggregated as one flow. Each active flow is associated with a unique flow ID in
the table. A simple way of assigning the flow ID is to use the source IP address
as the flow ID if this flow’s destinations are secure, and to use destination
IP address as the flow ID if one flow’s destination may be compromised. We
assign 64 bits for the flow ID field.
The FlowPolice router maintains flow-level information in the flow table.
As depicted in Figure 3.3, each flow entry is composed of 9 fields, but only 3
fields are updated relatively frequently based on packet arrival and the rest
are updated once per detection period. The period TA and packet ID Pid are
used to create capabilities (Section 3.4). RT is a one bit tag to determine
1In this case, if the public servers were compromised, attackers would not need to
leverage flooding traffic to launch DDoS attacks any more. Thus we assume the servers
are not compromised.
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whether rate limiting should be applied for f . TC indicates whether f is in its
first period. ST indicates the number of consecutive periods that f ’s loss rate
is below the threshold. PR indicates the number of received packets from f .
WR decides the maximum number of privileged packets allowed for f . The
verification window WV is used to infer packet losses. LR is the packet loss
rate for f . In Section 3.6, we will describe how to populate the flow table
and articulate how to use these flow-level information to make rate limiting
decisions.
3.6 Rate Limiting Logic
FlowPolice makes rate limiting decisions based on inferred packet losses. In
normal scenarios (without DDoS attacks), FlowPolice does not enforce rate
limiting so that each flow can get its share of the bandwidth. However, when
FlowPolice infers severe packet losses, it will execute per-flow rate limiting
to suppress attack traffic.
3.6.1 Populating the flow table
Before diving into the detail of the rate limiting algorithm, we first describe
how to populate the flow table. Assume at time ts, a new flow f is established
(puzzle solution is verified). All fields of the newly created flow entry are
initialized to be zero. The router first updates TA as ts. Then it increases
both PR and Pid by one, creates a new capability specific to the new Pid,
adds the capability to the packet header and forwards the packet to next
hop.
When the router receives a regular packet from f , it first increases PR by
one. Then it performs hash verification to determine whether the carried
capability is valid. Unverified packets are dropped. Otherwise, based on the
verified capability, the router updates the verification window WV to keep
track of the received feedbacks. Further, the router may also create a new
capability to replace the old one. We defer the details for updating WV and
generating capabilities in Section 3.6.2.
When kth detection period ends and k+1th period starts, FlowPolice needs
to perform flow analysis (e.g., learn loss rates) and updates the flow table as
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well. The router detects a new period for f when it receives the first packet
from f in k+1th period. Specifically, when a packet arrives, if TA in its flow
entry is more than one period older than the packet arrival time ts (i.e.,
TA +Dp < ts, where Dp is the length of detection period), the router realizes
that the current packet is the first one received in k+1th period. Then the
router updates TA as ts, and performs the following updates in order.
Period counter: If TC > 0, do not update it. Otherwise, increase TC by
one.
Rate limiting: Update WR, RT , ST and LR according to the Algorithm 1
(§3.6.3).
Reset: Set WV , PR and Pid to zero.
3.6.2 Inferring packet losses
The FlowPolice router uses capability feedback loop to infer packet losses,
especially the losses caused by the remote bottleneck links. Note that the
receiver needs to return the capabilities back to the sender so that the sender
can present these capabilities to the router to prove the delivery of packets.
Thus if the detection period length is at least two times the typical Internet
RTTs, the capabilities stamped in the first half of each period should be
received by the router by the end of the period. In contrast, if some packets
carrying capabilities are lost somewhere on their way to the destination,
the receiver will not receive these packets so it cannot return the capabilities
back to the sender. As a result, the router cannot receive those lost capability
feedbacks as well. Therefore, by monitoring the capability feedback loop, the
FlowPolice router can infer remote packet losses.
Next we describe how to create new capabilities. For each of the first Kth
packets that arrive at during the first half of each period (i.e., the arrive time
ts < TA + Dp/2), the router increases Pid in the flow entry by one, creates
a new capability specific to the new Pid via Equation (3.1), stamps the new
capability in the header to replace the old one and forwards the packet. Then
the router waits for these Kth unique capabilities till the end of the period.
If a flow only sends K0 packets and K0 < Kth, the router will just create K0
capabilities for the flow.
We add two constraints for generating new capabilities: only creating new
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capabilities during the first half of the period and generating at most Kth
capabilities in each period. The first constraint is because we need to allow
sufficient time (at least half of Dp) for each capability to return back to the
router so that the unreceived capabilities are lost rather than delayed. The
second constraint is added to save memory usage for the capability feedback
verification, as described below.
Assume the router generates Kth distinguished capabilities with packet ID
ranging from [1, Kth] during the first half of the kth period. Each time a new
packet carrying valid capability arrives during this period, the router checks
the packet ID in its capability to determine which previously stamped packet
has been received by the receiver. We implement WV as a window with Kth
bits. Initially all the bits are set as zero. If a packet carrying a capability with
packet ID i is received, the router sets the ith bit in WV as one. Therefore,
if by the end of the period, all the Kth bits in WV are one, the router can
verify that all the stamped packets during the first half of the period have
been received by the receiver. Otherwise, the packets indicated by the zero
bits inWV are lost. To avoid capability reuse attack, the router only accepts
the capability feedbacks issued within the current period (see more details
in Chapter 4).
Note that each issued capability consumes one bit inWV . To save memory
usage and meanwhile be able to learn the statistical packet loss rate, we set
the threshold Kth = 128 so that WR consumes only 16 bytes space, whereas
it is large enough to avoid statistical bias. For the rest of the packets received
during the first half of the period (besides the first Kth ones) and the packets
received during the second half, the router stops issuing new capabilities and
simply performs capability verification to update the WV correspondingly.
The statistical packet loss rate of flow f during the kth period can be
obtained via Pid andWV . Note the number of capabilities generated for f is
recorded in Pid of the flow entry and Pid <= Kth. Thus the inferred packet
loss rate is V0Pid , where V0 is the number of unverified bits (zero bits) in WV .
3.6.3 Rate limiting algorithm
FlowPolice makes the rate limiting decision for f based its packet loss rate
LR. One design detail is that during the first detection period, the router
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cannot make a rate limiting decision for f since it has not yet learned its
packet loss rate. However, if FlowPolice does not place rate limiting for
all flows during the first period, attackers can compromise the defense by
continuing to generate new flows so that these new flows are within the
initial period and can get a free pass.
To address such attacks, FlowPolice sets the packets from flows that are
in their first period (TC is zero) as the best-effort FlowPolice packets by
properly marking the FlowPolice packet header. Note that the bottleneck
router (either the FlowPolice router or the remote one) prioritizes the privi-
lege packets over the best effort packets. Therefore, such a design offers two
good features. First, in normal scenarios without DDoS attacks, the arrived
packets, including the best-effort FlowPolice packets, can be processed timely
since the network is often over-provisioned [37] so that the router has enough
capability to deal will all arrived packets. Therefore, FlowPolice does not
have negative effects in a normal situation. Second, in case of DDoS attacks,
attackers cannot exhaust the bandwidth via excessive new flows since their
packets from the fresh flows are processed with low priority. The only ef-
fect of continuing to generate new attack flows is that legitimated flows that
are in their initial period may experience large queuing delay. However, the
problem has been downgraded from denial of service to low quality of service.
Starting from the second detection period, the router uses the statistical
loss rate to make rate limiting decisions. The rate limiting algorithm is
in Algorithm 1. In particular, FlowPolice adopts the metric packetLoss to
determine whether f ’s rate should be limited. When obtaining packetLoss
for f , we consider its previous packet losses as well as the recently learned
loss rate. Such a design is used to defend against the on-off shrew attack [23]
(see detailed analysis in §4). If packetLoss is larger than the pre-defined
thresholds L↓Th (§3.6.5), FlowPolice classifies f as a maliciously behaved flow.
Therefore, FlowPolice enables its rate limiting and multiplicatively reduces
its WR. Otherwise, FlowPolice believes that f is well-behaved and turns off
its rate limiting correspondingly.
Based on the rate limiting decisions, executing the rate limiting is simply
marking all the newly arrived packets as best-effort FlowPolice packets when
PR > WR and RT = 1. FlowPolice turns off the rate limiting after f ’s loss
rate has been below the threshold for STh consecutive periods, indicating that
f is not experiencing severe congestion so that FlowPolice does not need to
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police traffic for f .
Algorithm 1: Rate limiting algorithm.
1 begin
2 for each arrived packet P of flow f do
/* first detection period */
3 if TC < 1 then
4 Mark P as a best-effort FlowPolice packet;
5 else
6 if P is the 1st packet of f in kth period then
7 RateLimit();
8 RateLimit() begin
/* recently learnt packet losses in kth period */
9 recentLoss← V0Pid ;
10 if recentLoss < L↑Th then
11 ST ← ST + 1;
12 else
13 ST ← 0;
/* stop policing after STh consecutive low loss periods */
14 if ST > STh then
15 RT ← 0; WR ← RW ;
16 else
17 RT ← 1;
/* policing policy */
18 if RT then
/* consider history packet losses */
19 packetLoss← (1− λ) ∗ recentLoss+ λ ∗ LR;
/* severe packet losses */
20 if packetLoss > L↓Th then
/* Half the rate limiting window */
21 WR ← (1− β) · WR;
22 else if packetLoss < L↑Th then
/* set WR as the received packet counter */
23 WR ←WR +4;
/* update LR */
24 LR ← packetLoss;
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To sum up, FlowPolice’s rate limiting algorithm ensures that in normal
scenarios, all flows can effectively utilize the bandwidth via privileged packets
by turning off their rate limiting tags. In case of DDoS attacks, FlowPolice
polices the traffic via the AIMD updates for each flow’s rate limiting window
to resolve the congestion. Each participating flow has to comply with the
rate limiting and adjust its rate accordingly so as to obtain its fair share
(detailed in §3.6.4). Otherwise, the rate limiting window of misbehaved flows
(e.g., keep sending large volume of traffic in spite of severe losses) will keep
reducing and most of their traffic is marked as best-effort. Therefore, the
bottleneck router (either the FlowPolice router or a remote legacy router)
can easily thwart the unwanted traffic by implementing a simple prioritization
mechanism.
3.6.4 Fair bandwidth share guarantee
In this section, we prove that the rate limiting algorithm ensures per-flow
fairness. We start with the following lemma stating that RW for each flow
converges to the fair share of the bottleneck link.
Lemma 1. Given that NL legitimate flows and NA attack flows share the
bottleneck link with capacity C, the rate limiting window RW for each flow
converges to O( CNL+NA ) after enough rounds of AIMD updates.
Proof. This lemma is borrowed from the theoretical analysis in [38]. Specifi-
cally, when N users share a link with bounded capacity and each user adjusts
its rate based on link feedback via the AIMD mechanism (i.e., negative feed-
back causes multiplicative decrease to the rate and positive feedback causes
additive increase to the rate), all users’ rates will finally converge to fairness.
In the rate limiting algorithm, FlowPolice updates each flow’s RW based
on packet losses via the AIMD mechanism. Therefore, each flow’s RW will
eventually converge to fairness.
Given Lemma 1, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In the steady state, each attack flow can obtain at most (1+LTh)CNL+NA
share at the bottleneck link.
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Proof. Note that FlowPolice allows a maximum L↓Th loss rate before further
cutting the rate limiting window. Thus the optimal strategy for an attacker
flow is to send no more than 1+L↓Th times its rate limiting window, i.e., to
strictly comply with FlowPolice’s rate limiting. Otherwise, its share will be
further reduced.
Combing the above two lemmas, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In the steady state, each legitimate flow can obtain at least
(1+L↓Th)C
NL+NA share at the bottleneck link, given that its transport protocol can
fully utilize the allowed bandwidth.
Proof. Given the fairness of rate limiting windows among all users, the fair
bandwidth share for a legitimate flow is (i.e.,
(1+L↓Th)C
NL+NA ) if its transport proto-
col can fully utilize the allowed bandwidth. Note that the per-flow bandwidth
share is lower-bound for legitimate flows. In the case where attackers do not
use their optimal strategy (e.g., sending flat rates), legitimate flows can get
more bandwidth share than the per-flow fair share (see evaluation results in
Chapter 5).
3.6.5 Parameter discussions
FlowPolice’s design has several important parameters: the length of detection
period Dp, the rate limiting factor β, the additive value 4, the two packet
loss rate thresholds L↑Th and L
↓
Th, the weight for historical packet loss λ and
the STh for stopping traffic policing. We now discuss the reasoning for the
parameter choices.
Dp: The length of detection period should be at least two times the typical
RTTs of the Internet so that the capabilities can have sufficient time to
return back to the router. We tested the RTTs from our lab for top visited
websites [39] located on different continents. Most of the RTTs are within
50∼200ms and the largest one is less than 400ms. Further, relatively longer
detection period helps reduce statistical bias. However, Dp cannot be too
long so that FlowPolice cannot react to attacks agilely. To balance these
factors, 2∼4s is a reasonable choice for the period length.
β and 4: Note that the packet loss rate is a statistical result obtained over
an extended period of time (much longer than the RTTs). There are two
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cases in which one flow has high loss rate. The first is when it is experiencing
a severe congestion. The second is when the flow does not comply with
FlowPolice’s rate limiting and sends more packets than its RW . Under both
cases, FlowPolice needs to aggressively limit its traffic so that we set β = 0.5
in our algorithm. 4 is the additive value for updating the window. As Dp is
several times larger than the typical RTTs, we set 4 = 3.
L↓Th and L
↑
Th: The choice of L
↓
Th should be larger than the normal packet
loss rates. According to the previous measurements [40, 41], we set L↓Th =
5%. L↑Th should be small enough to indicate the current congestion is not
that severe so that users can slightly increase their rate. We set L↑Th = 1%.
In fact, based on their own network designs (e.g., the over-provisioning ratio
and the extent of traffic burstiness), network operators can have customized
settings on L↑Th and L
↓
Th.
λ: The value of λ represents how much credit FlowPolice will give on the
previous packet losses. To defend against the on-off shrew attacks (Chapter
4), FlowPolice gives high weight to the packet loss history by setting λ = 0.5.
Therefore, once a flow misbehaves, it will have a bad reputation for a while.
STh: If f ’s loss rate is below L
↑
Th for Sth consecutive periods, FlowPolice stops
policing its traffic. Therefore, Sth should be long enough (e.g., ∼10−100) to
indicate that the congestion has been resolved. In other words, FlowPolice
will stay in active mode until attackers stop launching DDoS attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we perform security analysis to demonstrate FlowPolice’s ro-
bustness. Specifically, we show how smart attackers may adjust their strate-
gies to break the defense and demonstrate that FlowPolice is resilient to their
attacks. FlowPolice uses the capability feedback to suppress illegal traffic.
Therefore, attackers who want to launch DDoS attacks have to break the
capability feedback loop to convince FlowPolice that they are sending legal
traffic. We enumerate the strategies that attackers may adopt to break the
defense.
Capability forgery: The straightforward strategy for attackers is to forge
capabilities to falsely tell the router that the lost packets have been received.
The design of the capability (Section 3.4) ensures that no one besides the
FlowPolice router can create valid capabilities since they are incorporated
with a keyed MAC. As long as the private key is secure, no capabilities can
be forged.
Capability misuse: Attackers may try to misuse capabilities to tell the
router that the lost packets were received. They can misuse capabilities in
the following two ways. First, they try to use the capability to verify the
delivery of a packet with a different packet ID. Second, they try to use the
capability with the same packet ID but issued in previous periods to verify
the delivery of a packet sent in the current period. Specifically, in kth period,
we denote the capability issued with packet ID i by C(i, k), which is carried
by the packet P(i, k). If C(i, k) is fed back to the router by the end of kth
period, FlowPolice confirms that P(i, k) has been successfully received by the
receiver. In the first misuse case, attackers use C(i, k) to verify the delivery
of P(j, k). Clearly, this is infeasible as C(i, k) can only be used to verify
the delivery of P(i, k). In the second case, attackers use C(i, k) (or even
the capabilities issued earlier than the kth period) to verify the delivery of
P(i, k+1). Again, FlowPolice will discard the capability because the router
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only accepts capabilities issued within the current period. To sum up, the
uniqueness of the combination of the detection period and packet ID ensures
that no capabilities can be reused. If the some packets are lost, there is no
way to deceive the router that they were not.
On-off shrew attack: The on-off shrew attack is also known as the low-rate
TCP attack [23] in which attackers set up periodic on-off “square-wave” flows
to exhausts the network resources. The attack exploits the TCP retransmis-
sion timeout mechanism and periodically causes packet losses for legitimate
TCP flows. Attackers properly tune the attack period so that each time le-
gitimate TCP flows recover from the timeouts, they will face another attack
peak, which forces them to enter even longer timeouts. Since FlowPolice uses
the packet losses inferred in the previous period to determine the rate lim-
iting for the current period, adversaries have the incentive to launch on-off
attack to evade the rate limiting. Specifically, in kth period, the attack flows
send excessive traffic to overload the links. Then in k+1th period, FlowPo-
lice will suppress these flows due to the severe packet losses. However, smart
attackers can simply stop sending in period k+1. As a result, the router will
detect no packet losses for them in the k+1th period so that it will turn off
their rate limiting tags for the k+2th period. Consequently, attackers can
re-launch attacks in period k+2. Such an on-off cycle repeats, and legitimate
flows are throttled to small throughput. The design of FlowPolice has con-
sidered such a smart strategy. Note that when the router makes rate limiting
decisions in Algorithm 1, it uses the metric packetLoss which incorporates
the previous packet losses. And FlowPolice gives high credit to the history
via proper parameter choice. As a result, as long as their flows have severe
packet losses in period k, attackers cannot “clear” the history even if they
stop sending in the k+1th period. As a result, attackers cannot re-launch an
attack in period k+1.
Flow regeneration attack: Attackers may regenerate new flows once their
previous attack flows are detected; i.e., after several detection periods, their
rate limiting windows are small. FlowPolice is resilient to such attacks as
well. On one hand, each time attackers initiate a new flow, they have to solve
a puzzle (Section 3.3). Therefore, the number of flows attackers can initiate
is bounded. Furthermore, as each new generated flow has to go through
rate limiting as well (Section 3.6.3), creating new flows actually makes no
difference.
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Other strategies: Other strategies (such as collusion between senders and
receivers) cannot break the defense as well since the design of FlowPolice
makes no further assumptions on attackers.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION
In this chapter, we describe the evaluation of FlowPolice. We implement
FlowPolice on a software router to demonstrate that FlowPolice introduces
small packet processing overhead and can scale up to deal with very large
scale DDoS attacks involving millions of attack flows. We further evaluate
FlowPolice’s packet forwarding performance via Click [42] implementation
on our testbed. Finally, we carefully design detailed packet-level simulation
on ns-3 [43] to prove that FlowPolice is effective to mitigate large scale DDoS
attacks.
To evaluate FlowPolice, we also compare FlowPolice with previous pro-
posed approaches. Arguably, all these approaches are effective under certain
assumptions and deployment requirements. Without loss of generality, we
choose one of the previous proposed approaches, NetFence [14], as our bench-
mark. FlowPolice’s capability feedback design is inspired by NetFence’s con-
gestion policing feedback, whereas NetFence has different ways of inferring
congestion. Specifically, FlowPolice relies on the self-created capabilities but
NetFence relies on the congestion markings by the bottleneck links. Another
difference is that FlowPolice polices bandwidth share based on congestion ac-
countability whereas NetFence ensures per-sender fair for the bottleneck link.
In our evaluation, we demonstrate that FlowPolice improves NetFence in the
following two perspectives. (i) FlowPolice introduces smaller per-packet pro-
cessing overhead. (ii) FlowPolice allows legitimate senders to potentially
achieve (almost) their desired throughput, rather than just per-sender fair
share when attackers do not strictly comply with the rate limiting enforced
by FlowPolice.
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5.1 Implementation
To evaluate FlowPolice’s packet processing overhead, we implement FlowPo-
lice on a software router equipped with 3.4GHz Intel i7 processors and 8GB
DDR3 RAM. To evaluate FlowPolice’s packet forwarding performance, we
set up a two-system testbed. The first system A sends traffic to the second
system B which serves as both the software router and the receiver. Both
systems are running Ubuntu kernel version 3.2.0-64. We add FlowPolice’s
packet processing logic into B’s Click implementation, whereas A runs the
original Click software. A and B are connected via an Ethernet switch with
1Gbps ports. Click is running at the kernel mode.
In our implementation, we use the CBC-AES (with a 128 bits key) based
on the Intel AES-NI library to compute the MACs in the capabilities due to
its fast speed and available support on our software router [35]. For instance,
our implementation on a single i7 core can support AES encryption at the
rate of ∼4 cycles per byte and decryption at rate of ∼0.7 cycle per byte.
Further optimization is possible [44].
5.1.1 Scalability
As discussed in Section 3.5, the size for one flow entry is ∼50 bytes. Thus,
even though the FlowPolice router maintains a flow table for 100 million
flows, the memory size is only ∼5GB, which can be effectively managed by
our software router with 8G memory. We show the per-packet processing
overheads for three table sizes (1, 10 and 100 million entries) in Table 5.1.
For a flow table with 1 million entries, the overall per-packet processing
overheads introduced by FlowPolice for request packets and regular pack-
ets are ∼0.2µs and ∼0.075µs, respectively.1 The request packet has larger
overhead since the software router needs to assign memory for the new flow
entry, which is time-consuming. As request packets are sent to initiate new
flows and make up only a small fraction of total packets, they cannot be-
come the bottleneck. Note that the overall per-packet processing overhead
is composed of two major parts: flow table update time and AES operation
overhead. In Table 5.1, we also explicitly list the flow table update overhead,
1In Table 5.1, we do not show the overhead for puzzle verification in request packets’
processing overhead. Based on [16], such overhead is less than 1µs.
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Table 5.1: FlowPolice’s per-packet processing overhead (µs) on our testbed.
Request
Regular
Flow table 
size
Packet 
type
Table update 
overhead
Overall 
overhead
1 million
~0.18
~0.047
~0.20
~0.075
Request
Regular
10 million
~0.18
~0.050
~0.20
~0.078
Request
Regular
100 million
~0.18
~0.052
~0.20
~0.080
which makes up over 60% of the overall overhead.
From the results, it is clear that the per-packet processing overheads for
1 and 100 million flow table size are almost the same. Thus FlowPolice can
effectively scale up to deal with DDoS attacks with millions of attack flows.
Furthermore, the ∼0.08µs per-packet processing overhead will transfer to
∼150Gbps throughput for 1500B packets. Thus the deployed router can still
support high speed Ethernet.
As our benchmark, we compare FlowPolice’s packet processing overhead
with NetFence [14]. Based on its implementation, NetFence’s per-packet
processing overhead is around 1.3µs. This is because their software router
cannot support AES operation at line speed. However, even assuming that
NetFence is deployed on routers with AES operation supported at line speed,
it may still introduce larger overhead that FlowPolice. To begin with, Net-
Fence requires cryptography processing at both the access router and the
bottleneck router (may be more than one). However, FlowPolice only in-
troduces one-time overhead at the deploying router. Furthermore, NetFence
needs around 2GB memory at the access router to keep 1 million rate lim-
iters, whereas FlowPolice only requires∼50MB. As memory accessing is more
time-consuming, NetFence may have larger packet processing overhead.
5.1.2 Packet forwarding performance
In this section, we evaluate FlowPolice’s packet forwarding performance. In
particular, we examine the throughput (the bandwidth utilized by whole
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Figure 5.1: Packet forwarding performance.
packets) and goodput (the bandwidth used to deliver the payload of the
packets, excluding the FlowPolice header). System A sends traffic at its full
speed (up to 1Gbps) with different packet sizes to system B. We perform
measurements at B to learn the throughput and goodput.
The results are illustrated in Figure 5.1. The baseline experiments are
performed without enabling FlowPolice. We consider 4 packet sizes (64B,
512B, 1024B and 1500B, including the FlowPolice header) in the experiments.
Note that for the smallest packet size (i.e., 64B), the baseline throughput is
much less than the available link capacity (1Gbps). The decline is mainly
caused by the limitation of the Click router’s throughput; i.e., although
the network links still have extra bandwidth, the Click router cannot process
packets faster. It is clear that FlowPolice’s throughput is close to the baseline
due to its small packet processing overhead. As FlowPolice’s header size is
fixed (28B), the goodput is close to the throughput for larger packet sizes.
5.2 DDoS Attack Mitigation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of FlowPolice for mitigating
DDoS attacks via detailed packet-level simulations on ns-3 [43].
5.2.1 Methodology
We consider three representative DDoS attack scenarios in our evaluation to
thoroughly investigate FlowPolice’s performance (illustrated in Figure 5.2).
In attack case (a), the bottleneck link directly connects to the FlowPolice
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Figure 5.2: Attack cases in our evaluation.
router. In scenario (b), the bottleneck link is located at one of the FlowPolice
router’s downstream links. The third scenario (c) focuses on the case where
multiple remote bottleneck links exist. The second and third settings are
designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of FlowPolice’s single deployment.
We desire to emulate the real-world DDoS attacks in which up to millions
of attack flows try to flood a link whose capacity is on the order of gigabytes
per second. However, the existing packet-level simulators or emulators, such
as ns-2 [45], ns-3 and Mininet [46], will take prohibitively long to emulate
extremely large scale DDoS attacks. Assume that the simulator can process
one million packets per second and that one million attack flows, each sending
at 5Mbps, try to flood a 10Gbps link. Even if we set the packet size as the
maximum allowed size 1500B, it will take the simulator around 140 hours to
simulate just one second of the attack.
To resolve the problem, we adopt the similar approach used in NetFence [14].
Specifically, we fix the number of nodes (both attackers and legitimate users)
and scale down the link capacity to simulate the large scale attacks. For in-
stance, by varying the link capacity from 50Mbps to 500Mbps, we are able to
simulate the attack scenarios where 100K to 1 million attackers try to flood
a 100Gbps link.
We evaluate FlowPolice using two performance metrics: flow completion
time (FCT) and average throughput. To evaluate the first metric, each legit-
imate sender transmits a 2MB file to its destination and we use the file trans-
ferring time as the FCT. Such traffic represents the common web browsing
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traffic where a typical web page size is around 2MB [47]. We put emphasis on
FCT for this experiment setting since latency is the more important perfor-
mance metric for short flows [48]. To learn the average throughput, legitimate
users are configured to set up long-lived TCP flows. Such case corresponds
to the Internet background traffic such as the WAN workloads [37, 49]. Un-
der such scenarios, throughput is the right metric as these flows carry huge
volumes of traffic and typically are latency insensitive.
5.2.2 Throughput evaluation
As proved in Section 3.6.4, FlowPolice ensures that attackers cannot gain
more than their fair share at the bottleneck even with their optimal strategies.
In reality, it may be difficult for attackers to learn the exact maximum allowed
rates since they are unaware of all these rate-limiting parameters and how
much traffic the bottleneck link can handle. Therefore, attackers need to
probe the available network resources and adjust their rates accordingly.
In our evaluation, we consider three representative strategies for attackers.
The first strategy is a hypothetical in which that attackers can know their
exact allowed rates. The major purpose of considering this strategy is to
align our evaluation with our theoretical analysis. In the second strategy,
attackers probe the available bandwidth so as to comply with their rate limit.
This strategy represents the real-world optimal strategy for attackers. In the
third strategy, attackers do not comply with the rate limiting enforced by
FlowPolice (e.g., sending flat rate in spite of packet losses). Such a strategy is
effective and common in practice when defense protocols do not incorporate
congestion accountability in the traffic policing.
As wide area networks often have 2−3× bandwidth over-provisioning to
tolerate traffic burstiness [37], we set the average traffic volume of legiti-
mate users as half of the link capacity in our evaluation; i.e., the desired
throughput for all legitimate senders is half of the capacity. However, the
attack traffic volume can be as much as 2× the link capacity. The number
of legitimate senders is ∼10% of the attacker number as attackers may re-
cruit large numbers of botnets. Figure 5.4 shows the evaluation results. For
simplicity, we use the TCP protocol for legitimate users’ transport protocol,
whereas attackers can have their self-defined transport protocol. To perform
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Figure 5.4: Throughput ratio for legitimate users when attackers do not
comply with FlowPolice’s rate limiting.
fair comparison with NetFence, we make the same assumption as NetFence in
the evaluation: source spoof is eliminated. However, the design of FlowPolice
does not assume that source spoofing is eliminated.
The results are illustrated in Figure 5.3. It is clear that the optimal
throughput for attackers is the per-sender fair share. If attackers do not
strictly comply with the rate limiting enforced by FlowPolice, their through-
put share is reduced to almost zero. In such a case, legitimate senders can
achieve almost their desired throughput as illustrated in Figure 5.4. Note
that we evaluate all legitimate senders together rather than explicitly evalu-
ate each sender’s throughput. This is because FlowPolice is responsible for
suppressing attack traffic so that legitimate senders are not affected by the
flooding attack. However, FlowPolice does not explicitly assign a rate for each
sender. Thus the volume of bandwidth shared by each legitimate sender is
determined by its individual desired throughput, which can be different for
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different senders, and the bandwidth utilization efficiency by its transport
protocol (e.g., different TCP standards may have different efficiency).
To sum up, FlowPolice creates a dilemma for attackers: To launch DDoS
attacks, they have to aggressively inject large volumes of traffic into the
network whereas the more traffic they send during the congestion, the less
throughput they are allowed. As proved in theoretical analysis (Section 3.6.4)
and demonstrated in our evaluation, attackers have to probe the network con-
dition to adjust their rates accordingly. In other words, the optimal strategy
for attackers is the least efficient way for launching DDoS attacks. There-
fore, by incorporating congestion accountability, FlowPolice can effectively
regulate behaviors of all participating flows and mitigate DDoS attacks.
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 are based on the case (c) of Figure 5.2, which
is the most general and challenging one in our settings. FlowPolice ensures
similar throughput for legitimate senders in the other two cases. We omit
the results for those two scenarios for clear presentation.
If source spoofing is possible, FlowPolice can still detect misbehaved flows
and place rate limitings as long as they are overloading the bottleneck link.
FlowPolice terminates the rate limiting only if no packets are lost, which
indicates the bottleneck link has enough capacity to handle the arrived
packets. Therefore, legitimate users will get their share of the bandwidth.
However, the bandwidth allowed for legitimate senders may be smaller than
the case where source spoof is eliminated since attackers can generate new
flows to keep filling up the bottleneck link. As FlowPolice incorporates the
Portcullis [16] protocol so that the number of attack flows is limited, such a
problem can be mitigated.
5.2.3 FCT evaluation
To evaluate the FCT performance under attack, we perform a 2MB file trans-
fer between legitimate senders and receivers. We conduct 10 trails for each
sender and receiver pair to learn the average FCT. As we can see from the
results (Figure 5.5), the average FCT increase is ∼1.3× during attacks. How-
ever, we find that without FlowPolice, the file transfer cannot be finished
during attacks. Thus FlowPolice mitigates the problem from denial of ser-
vice to low quality of service. The major cause of FCT inflation is the packet
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Figure 5.5: Average FCT for legitimate senders.
queuing delay during the initial stage of the flows (as discussed in Section
3.6.3).
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we make several remarks on the aspects that are not covered
so far.
Application layer defense: Note that the design of FlowPolice focuses
on solving flooding based DDoS attacks at the network layer. However,
FlowPolice can be incorporated with the application layer defense protocols
as well. For instance, if an application can detect attack requests and does
not return the capabilities carried by attack flows back to attackers, the
FlowPolice router will be able to infer large packet losses for attack flows
so as to suppress the attack traffic. As a result, attackers will not be able
to consume the network resource. In fact, combining with application layer
defense protocols provides a new defense primitive for the routers to police
flows.
Congestion probe: FlowPolice’s overhead can be further reduced if conges-
tion probe is available with the AS. Specially, network operators can probe
the network condition via background flows and explicit routing control [32]
within its AS, and enable FlowPolice only if some in-network links are con-
gested and flows need to be policed. Therefore, FlowPolice will introduce
zero overhead in normal scenarios.
Flow paths: FlowPolice assumes that one flow’s path is stable. Although
some load balancing protocols, like ECMP, stripe traffic across multiple
paths, packets from the same flow are still assigned to the same path. Thus
FlowPolice is compatible with ECMP.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss related work that has inspired the design of Flow-
Police. Generally speaking, we categorize the previous DDoS defense ap-
proaches into two major schools (i.e., filtering based approaches and capa-
bility based approach), whereas there are other approaches built on different
defense primitives.
Filtering-based systems (e.g., IP Traceback [3, 5], AITF[9], Pushback [6, 7],
StopIt [10]) try to defend against DDoS attacks by filtering attack flows.
Therefore, they need to find a way to differentiate attack flows and legitimate
flows. For instance, IP Traceback adopts a packet marking algorithm to
construct the path that carries attack traffic so as to block attack flows. AITF
aggregates all traffic traversing the same series of ASs as one Flow and blocks
such flow if the victim AS suspects attacks. Pushback informs upstream
routers to block certain type of traffic. StopIt assumes the receiver can detect
the attack flows. As mentioned before, filtering based systems often require
remote ASs to block attack traffic, which is difficult to enforce. Furthermore,
these systems may falsely block legitimate flows since the method used to
detect attack flows may have a high false positive rate (e.g., aggregate flows
based on traversing ASs).
The capability based systems, such as SIFF [8] and TVA [13], try to sup-
press attack traffic by only allowing packets carrying valid capabilities, e.g.,
signatures from the routers on the path. The original design is vulnerable
to the aforementioned DoC attack, which is mitigated by the Portcullis [16]
protocol. Further, the colluding attackers located on two sides of the victim
can grant each other capabilities so that they can still flood the network with
privileged packets. NetFence [14] is proposed to achieve per-sender fairness
under the colluding scenario.
However, all these approaches assume universal deployment. CRAFT [50]
and Mirage [21] are proposed towards real-world deployment. A CRAFT
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router emulates TCP states for all traversing flows so that no one can get a
greater share than what TCP allows. However, since TCP have many stan-
dards and some traffic (e.g., video flows [51]) may even not use standard
TCP protocols, CRAFT is not compatible with a real Internet environment
and also limits future transport protocol innovation. Mirage [21] is a puz-
zle based solution and can be incorporated into IPv6 deployment, but it is
designed only for securing Web applications.
Other DDoS defense solutions, besides the above two categories, include
SpeakUp [17], Phalanx [19], SOS [18] and some future Internet architecture
proposals like XIA [52] and SCION [30]. SpeakUp allows legitimate senders
to increase their rates to compete with attackers. Such an approach is effec-
tive when the bottleneck happens at the application layer so that legitimate
users can get more requests processed given all their requests can be deliv-
ered. In the case where network is the bottleneck, SpeakUp may potentially
congest the network. Phalanx [19] and SOS [18] propose to use large scale
overlay networks to defend DDoS attacks. XIA and SCION focus on building
the clean-state Internet architecture so as to enhance Internet security, e.g.,
packet accountability [33].
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This thesis presents the design, implementation and evaluation of FlowPolice,
a new DDoS defense mechanism offering three desirable deployment features.
(i) The local deployment feature allows FlowPolice to immediately benefit the
first deployed AS without further deployment at other ASs. Such lightweight
deployment requirement provides incentives for large scale deployment. (ii)
The single deployment feature enables a single FlowPolice router to protect
all its downstream bottleneck links that implement a simple prioritization
mechanism, i.e., prioritizing FlowPolice’s privileged packets. With the flexi-
bility provided by FlowPolice, network operators are able to secure all their
ASs with small numbers of deployed routers. (iii) The effectiveness of Flow-
Police is merely based on the self-created capability tags, which increases the
system robustness. In its design, FlowPolice adopts a congestion feedback
mechanism similar to that of NetFence [14], whereas FlowPolice relies on self-
created capability feedback to infer remote congestion so that the deploying
router can perform flow policing at upstream locations. Our implementation
on Linux demonstrates that FlowPolice can scale up to effectively deal with
millions of attack flows with small per-packet processing overhead. Our de-
tailed packet-level simulation proves that FlowPolice can effectively mitigate
DDoS attacks.
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